Love this question. Different countries have tried very different levers—retail, wholesale/logistics, “public options,” co-ops, and hard-nosed regulation. Here’s a quick world tour with how well each seems to work.

China — state-backed vertical integration + reserves

What they do: Use large state firms (notably COFCO) to control chunks of the grain/oils trade and processing, including big overseas acquisitions to secure supply; run strategic food reserves (notably pork) that the state buys into or releases from to smooth prices; and a long-running “Vegetable Basket” policy making city leaders responsible for stable supply of everyday food. www.cofco.com www.cofcointernational.com www.world-grain.com www.reuters.com english.www.gov.cn www.sciencedirect.com
How it’s gone: The reserve tools are used frequently (e.g., new pork reserve purchases announced in August 2025) and do help dampen short-term volatility—but they don’t eliminate cycles and can carry fiscal/storage costs. The SOE footprint gives the state leverage over upstream margins and logistics transparency, but China still faces periodic price spikes and local bottlenecks. www.thepigsite.com www.tridge.com www.reuters.com Takeaway: A public hand on reserves and mid-supply chain can stabilize essentials without running thousands of stores—but it’s capital- and management-intensive.

Australia — duopoly discipline via inquiries, codes, and discounter entry

What they do: Coles/Woolworths dominate; government pressed the regulator (ACCC) into a major 2024–25 inquiry; the Senate pushed for divestiture powers and a mandatory code of conduct (politically contested). www.accc.gov.au www.abc.net.au www.aph.gov.au
Discounter effect: ALDI’s entry created a persistent price gap (often ~8–20% cheaper than majors, depending on basket/method). That competitive presence is one of the few reliably measurable price-pressures in the market. www.abc.net.au www.accc.gov.au
How it’s gone: Structural reform is still in motion; government has leaned toward transparency and supplier-fairness measures rather than break-ups. There’s broad agreement that more competition reduces prices, but no silver bullet yet. www.theguardian.com www.foodnavigator-asia.com Takeaway: Letting in strong discounters + tightening conduct rules works better (and cheaper) than trying to run public supermarkets.

Scandinavia — cooperative giants + tough enforcement

What they do:
Finland: Co-ops are huge (S-Group ~49% share; K-Group ~34%; Lidl ~9%). Co-ops return bonuses/dividends to members and run their own wholesale. www.pty.fi www.kesko.fi
Sweden: ICA, Axfood, Coop ~90% of market; government probed margins during the 2023–25 inflation surge. www.axfood.com www.reuters.com
Norway: Three players (NorgesGruppen, Coop, REMA 1000) dominate; the authority levied record fines over anti-competitive information exchange (fines upheld this month). www.reuters.com www.mlex.com legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com
How it’s gone: Co-ops can align incentives with consumers and often keep quality high, but concentrated markets still need active policing—recent Nordic enforcement shows that even co-op heavy systems are prone to oligopoly behaviour. www.konkurrensverket.se Takeaway: Co-ops + strong antitrust can work, but you still need real teeth on enforcement.

Singapore — quasi-public “public option” (co-op retail) + price actions

What they do: NTUC FairPrice, a union-linked cooperative with government backing, behaves like a public option—stockpiles, house-brand essentials, time-bound price freezes in inflationary periods. www.straitstimes.com www.fairpricegroup.com.sg
How it’s gone: It doesn’t undercut every item, but it anchors a baseline on core goods and pressures rivals—without the state owning the entire market. www.fairpricegroup.com.sg Takeaway: A well-run co-op with policy support can deliver many benefits of a public grocer with fewer political/operational risks.

France & Spain — public wholesale “backbone” markets

What they do:
France: The Rungis International Market—state-owned and operated via a semi-public company (Semmaris)—is the world’s largest fresh wholesale hub. en.wikipedia.org www.crwflags.com
Spain: MERCASA, a state company, runs a national network of wholesale food markets (Red de Mercas) as a public service to ensure transparent distribution and competition. www.sepi.es
How it’s gone: These public wholesale utilities lower barriers for smaller retailers and foodservice, boost transparency, and discipline margins upstream—without the government running retail aisles. (This looks a lot like your vertical-integration-lite idea.) Takeaway: Public ownership of logistics/wholesale is a proven middle path that scales.

New Zealand — force wholesale access to break a duopoly

What they do: The Grocery Industry Competition Act 2023 created a Grocery Commissioner, a wholesale access regime, and a supply code; regulators are now probing stronger regulation for wholesale terms. www.legislation.govt.nz www.mbie.govt.nz comcom.govt.nz
How it’s gone: Still early, but this is the clearest live test of mandated wholesale access to help new/indie retailers compete on comparable costs. comcom.govt.nz Takeaway: Mandated wholesale access is a surgical fix when vertical integration blocks entrants.

India — direct public retail for staples (PDS)

What they do: The Public Distribution System sells subsidized grains to ~800 million people via ~500k “fair price shops.” www.worldbank.org
How it’s gone: Enormous poverty-reduction impact where well run, but leakage/bureaucracy challenges persist; it’s a targeted welfare model more than a market-wide price anchor. en.wikipedia.org

What seems to work (pattern-matching across countries)

Public wholesale/logistics utilities (France/Spain)
→ Lower the entry cost for small chains and co-ops; shine light on hidden markups in storage/transport. This is closest to your “crown-owned distribution/cold chain” idea—and it already works abroad. en.wikipedia.org www.sepi.es
Mandated wholesale access (New Zealand)
→ If you don’t want to own warehouses, require integrated giants to sell at fair wholesale terms so rivals can compete on shelf price. Early but promising. www.legislation.govt.nz comcom.govt.nz
A credible discounter (Australia’s ALDI)
→ Measurable, sustained price pressure without public ownership. Works best if zoning/land-banking barriers are curbed. www.abc.net.au www.accc.gov.au
A quasi-public retail anchor (Singapore’s FairPrice)
→ A co-op with policy backing can act as a de-facto public option, using house-brands and occasional price freezes to set a floor for essentials. www.straitstimes.com www.fairpricegroup.com.sg
Reserves for shocks (China)
→ Strategic stockpiles/reserve releases are effective shock absorbers for a few staples; they don’t replace competition policy but help with volatility. english.www.gov.cn

If Canada wanted to copy the best bits

Build a public distribution/cold-chain utility (à la Rungis/MERCASA) that leases space and logistics at transparent, at-cost tariffs to all retailers and co-ops. en.wikipedia.org www.sepi.es
Pass a wholesale access regime (NZ-style) so integrated giants must offer fair wholesale terms to independents. www.legislation.govt.nz
Recruit discounters (Aldi/Lidl) by fixing zoning/land-banking and easing DC build-outs. www.abc.net.au
Consider a co-op public option (Singapore model) to anchor essentials—not a full crown grocer chain. www.fairpricegroup.com.sg
Keep strategic reserves for a few staples to smooth spikes (China’s pork playbook). english.www.gov.cn If you want, I can sketch a Canada-specific blueprint that blends those four: public wholesale backbone + mandated wholesale access + a co-op anchor + targeted reserves.